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I. INTRODUCTION
For a relatively small agency in the federal establishment, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) attracts a good deal of notoriety.
In part, this stems from the fact that it routinely makes judgments
affecting human reproduction, including matters such as the over-thecounter availability of emergency contraceptives,1 approval of the
* Visiting Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School (2007–2008); Professor
of Law, University of Florida.
1. See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What
Ails American Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 374–76 (2006); Rob Stein,
FDA Approves Plan B’s Over-the-Counter Sale: No Prescription Will Be Required for
Women 18 or Older, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2006, at A4 (“The announcement was aimed
at resolving one of the longest and highest-profile health controversies of the Bush
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abortifacient drug mifepristone (also known as RU-486),2 regulation of
fertility treatments,3 and oversight of embryonic stem cell research.4 Not
surprisingly, the political branches have become increasingly interested
in the FDA’s decisions in these areas. One recent agency policy has,
however, largely escaped notice, even though it raises peculiar questions
that I have posed elsewhere:
[D]oes the FDA cross a constitutional line when it purports to require that
patients undergo periodic pregnancy testing and use contraceptives as a
condition of access to a drug known to cause birth defects? If such conditions
fail to reduce the number of birth defects, could the agency go one step further
and, at least in the case of teratogens indicated for chronic use, urge sellers to
require that patients first undergo a sterilization procedure if they wish to use
the drug?5

This Article tackles that puzzle. Part II elaborates on the history behind
the FDA’s distribution restrictions, and Part III finds parallels in other
contexts where policymakers have considered conditioning access to a
benefit on the waiver of reproductive rights. Part IV offers an extended
analysis of possible constitutional objections to the FDA’s policy.

administration, but opponents said they are considering plans to block the decision, either
in court or in Congress.”).
2. See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone
Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571 (2001); Marc
Kaufman, Abortion Foes Want RU-486 Pill Pulled, WASH. POST, May 17, 2006, at A3
(reporting that opponents have lobbied Congress and petitioned the FDA to withdraw the
approval).
3. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of
Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 648–59 (2003); see also FDA,
Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products: Donor Screening and
Testing, and Related Labeling, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,949 (May 25, 2005) (codified at 21
C.F.R. § 1271.90 (2006)) (amending rules to cover cryopreserved embryos later donated
to someone else).
4. See Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research
Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1144–47 (2004); see also Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J.
Rose, FDA Regulation of Human Cloning: Usurpation or Statesmanship?, 15 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 85 (2001).
5. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 119 (2d ed. 2007);
see also Noah, supra note 3, at 664 (“[G]iven the [Supreme] Court’s clear recognition of
a right to privacy in the context of contraception, one has to wonder about FDA
distribution restrictions that require patients to use two methods of birth control as a
condition of access to the teratogens Accutane and Thalomid.”). The lack of attention to
this issue strikes me as especially odd given the current administration’s apparent
antipathy toward promoting the wider use of contraceptives. See Noah, supra note 4, at
1145–52; Christopher Lee, Bush Choice for Family-Planning Post Criticized, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 2006, at A1 (“The Bush administration has appointed a new chief of
family-planning programs at the Department of Health and Human Services who worked
at a Christian pregnancy-counseling organization that regards the distribution of
contraceptives as ‘demeaning to women.’”).
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II. RESTRICTING ACCESS TO TERATOGENIC DRUGS
In 1982, the FDA approved Hoffmann-La Roche’s application to
market isotretinoin (Accutane®) for use in patients with severe recalcitrant
nodular acne.6 Although no one doubts its efficacy in treating this disfiguring
(though otherwise nonserious) condition,7 the drug is a potent teratogen:
it carries a significant (more than 25%) risk of miscarriage and major
birth defects such as facial deformities, severe mental retardation, and
lethal cardiac abnormalities.8 As further details about the teratogenic
potential of isotretinoin have emerged over the course of the last quarter
of a century, the FDA and the manufacturer adopted increasingly aggressive
mechanisms designed to prevent its use by pregnant women.9
The original labeling revealed that the drug caused fetal abnormalities
in animals, recommended that physicians not prescribe the drug to
female patients of childbearing age unless they used an effective form of
contraception, and suggested that patients who nonetheless become
pregnant while using the drug receive counseling about the desirability
of continuing their pregnancies.10 Within one year of approval, after
reports began to emerge of serious birth defects in humans, HoffmannLa Roche revised the drug’s labeling (and took other steps) to draw this

6. See Penny Chorlton, FDA Outpaced Firm on Acne Drug, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 1982, at A17. For the current version of the package insert, see Roche Lab., Inc.,
Accutane® Package Insert (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.rocheusa.com/products/accutane/
pi.pdf. For more background on the drug’s regulatory milestones, including a history of
its many labeling revisions, see FDA, Isotretinoin (Marketed as Accutane) Capsule
Information (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/default.htm.
Starting in 2002, generic versions of the drug became available (sold under the tradenames
Amnesteem®, Claravis®, and Sotret®). See Gideon Koren et al., Generic Isotretinoin: A
New Risk for Unborn Children, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1567 (2004).
7. See Aamir Haider & James C. Shaw, Treatment of Acne Vulgaris, 292 JAMA
726, 731 (2004); William D. James, Acne, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1463, 1469–70 (2005).
8. See Edward J. Lammer et al., Retinoic Acid Embryopathy, 313 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 837, 839–40 (1985). David Graham, the FDA whistleblower who attracted attention
after the withdrawal of Vioxx® (rofecoxib), reiterated in congressional testimony his
longstanding views that the agency should withdraw approval of isotretinoin. See Marc
Kaufman, Attempt to Discredit Whistle-Blower Alleged, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2004, at
A19.
9. See Ami E. Doshi, Comment, The Cost of Clear Skin: Balancing the Social
and Safety Costs of iPLEDGE with the Efficacy of Accutane (Isotretinoin), 37 SETON
HALL L. REV. 625, 630–45 (2007); see also id. at 659–60 (concluding that the FDA
should withdraw approval).
10. See Joan H. Krause, Accutane: Has Drug Regulation in the United States
Reached Its Limits?, 6 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 17 (1991).
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information to the attention of physicians.11 In 1988, because these
enhanced warnings did not entirely prevent prescribing of the drug to
women who became pregnant,12 the FDA persuaded the manufacturer to
develop a “Pregnancy Prevention Program” (PPP) that supplied physicians
with kits containing patient informed consent forms and other educational
materials.13 Revised labeling urged physicians to perform pregnancy
tests before prescribing the drug to their female patients, but this and other
aspects of the program lacked any mechanism for ensuring compliance.
In 2000, after receiving reports of gestational exposures caused by
failures in using hormonal contraceptives, the manufacturer revised the
labeling to recommend the use of two different forms of contraception.14
In 2001, when the FDA realized that these additional warnings and
related voluntary measures had still not prevented all use by pregnant
women,15 the agency approved SMART™ (System to Manage Accutane11. See Paul J. Benke, The Isotretinoin Teratogen Syndrome, 251 JAMA 3267,
3267 (1984); Roche Labs., Accutane Contraindicated in Pregnancy, 252 JAMA 2623
(1984).
12. See CDC, Birth Defects Caused by Isotretinoin—New Jersey, 37 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 171 (1988); Robert S. Stern, When a Uniquely Effective Drug Is
Teratogenic: The Case of Isotretinoin, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1007, 1008 (1989);
Michael Abramowitz & Philip J. Hilts, FDA Eyes Ban on Acne Drug: Study Links Use
by Pregnant Women to Birth Defects, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1988, at A1; Michael
Waldholz, FDA Panel Suggests Strict Limits on Use of Acne Drug That Causes Birth
Defects, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1988, at A3. Enhanced warnings of belatedly discovered
drug risks often have little impact on prescribing behavior. See Lars Noah, Medicine’s
Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 438–40 (2002).
13. See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Orders Curbs on Drug Linked to Birth Defects,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1988, at A1 (adding that “Roche was taking another unusual step in
offering to pay the costs of counseling for contraception and pregnancy tests for any
woman for whom Accutane is prescribed”); Judith Willis, New Warning About Accutane
and Birth Defects, FDA CONSUMER, Oct. 1988, at 26. Within a couple of years,
questions surfaced about the PPP’s effectiveness, but the FDA declined to order more
drastic restrictions at that time. See Charles Marwick, Additional Steps Proposed to
Ensure Antiacne Drug Used Only in Appropriate Patient Population, 263 JAMA 3125
(1990); William Booth, Education Drive on Risks of Accutane Said to Fail, WASH. POST,
May 22, 1990, at A9. The manufacturer had included an enrollment form for patients to
send to the Slone Epidemiology Unit at Boston University’s School of Public Health that
facilitated the tracking of patient compliance and adverse outcomes. See Allen A.
Mitchell et al., A Pregnancy-Prevention Program in Women of Childbearing Age
Receiving Isotretinoin, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 104–05 (1995) (concluding that the
PPP worked fairly well).
14. See Michelle Meadows, The Power of Accutane: The Benefits and Risks of a
Breakthrough Acne Drug, FDA CONSUMER, Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 18, 20. As lower dosage
formulations of hormonal contraceptives have become more popular, their failure rates
have increased. See Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Mulls Birth-Control Standards, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 19, 2007, at B5.
15. See, e.g., CDC, Accutane®-Exposed Pregnancies—California, 1999, 49
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 28 (2000); Kenneth Lyons Jones et al., Letter to
the Editor, Isotretinoin and Pregnancy, 285 JAMA 2079 (2001).
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Related Teratogenicity), a still more aggressive risk management program
developed by Hoffmann-La Roche. SMART attempted to require (through
physician registration with the manufacturer and use of special qualification
stickers as a prerequisite for dispensing by pharmacists) a negative
pregnancy test before prescribing a nonrefillable one month supply in
addition to an agreement by patients to use two methods of contraception or
abstain from sexual activity.16 The agency modeled this program on a
similar effort undertaken by the manufacturer of Thalomid® (thalidomide),
which the FDA had approved for the treatment of Hansen’s disease
(leprosy): STEPS™ (System for Thalidomide Education and Prescribing
Safety) sought to ensure that this infamous teratogen stay out of the
hands of persons who might become pregnant.17 Because semen could
carry residues of thalidomide, male patients also had to agree to use
contraceptives.18
In 2005, because SMART had not entirely lived up to expectations,
the FDA approved the iPLEDGE™ risk management program established
by the manufacturers of isotretinoin, which required prescribers, distributors,
and patients to register (on-line or by using a toll-free number) and attest
to their understanding of the risks and commitment to abide by the
pregnancy testing and contraception requirements.19 Physicians and
16. See Diane Knich, Accutane: New Rules Debut, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2002, at
F1; see also Margaret A. Honein et al., Can We Ensure the Safe Use of Known Human
Teratogens?: Introduction of Generic Isotretinoin in the US As an Example, 27 DRUG
SAFETY 1069, 1072 (2004); id. at 1075 (explaining that each generic version uses a
parallel risk management program).
17. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved to Treat Leprosy, with Other
Uses Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A1 (“If any doctors or pharmacists refuse to
comply with the distribution rules, their privileges to prescribe or dispense the drug
might be revoked.”); Jamie Talan, Thalidomide’s Legacy, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at
F10; cf. Michael E. Weinblatt, Editorial, Methotrexate for Chronic Diseases in Adults,
332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 330, 331 (1995) (explaining that low doses of this chemotherapy
agent may help treat autoimmune diseases, but warning that its teratogenicity means that
female patients should not become pregnant). Celgene also sells Revlimid® (lenalidomide), a
thalidomide derivate for multiple myeloma subject to the same distribution restrictions
(under the RevAssist™ program). See Revlimid Homepage, http://www.revlimid.com
(last visited June 14, 2007).
18. See Rita Rubin, Thalidomide Could Guide Use of Drugs That Risk Birth
Defects, USA TODAY, July 22, 1998, at 7D. Given the far more limited range of options
and lower reliability of contraceptives for men, male patients would have to ensure that
their female partners use contraceptives (otherwise, one wonders whether the FDA might
have called for vasectomies as a condition for access).
19. See Laurel Naversen Geraghty, Doctors Fear Acne Drug Rules Go Too Far,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at G3; Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Imposes Tougher Rules for
Acne Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at A1 (“The new program is the latest and by far
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patients have expressed frustration about the sometimes cumbersome
barriers to access erected by iPLEDGE, but at least initially the program
has succeeded where its predecessors had failed—namely, in preventing
pregnancies among users of the drug.20 In contrast with the gradual
adoption of ever tighter access requirements for isotretinoin in this
country, British regulators long ago imposed even more stringent distribution
restrictions, including a requirement that patients agree to undergo an
immediate abortion in case they become pregnant while using the drug.21
Over the last two decades, and in parallel with the FDA’s incremental
approach to addressing Accutane’s teratogenicity, victims have pursued
tort litigation against Hoffmann-La Roche. For the most part, courts
have rejected inadequate warning claims.22 In one recent case, a woman
most drastic of more than 40 efforts by the agency in the last 22 years to reduce harm
from Accutane . . . while allowing its continued use.”).
20. See Sandra G. Boodman, Too Hard to Take: A Strict New Acne Drug Program
May Prevent Birth Defects, but Many Complain It Also Drives People Away from a
Potentially Life-Transforming Treatment, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2006, at F1 (“Public
health officials say such strict regulation is necessary because years of progressively
stronger voluntary programs failed to prevent pregnancy in users of the medicine . . . .”);
id. (“Between 1982 and 2005, 2,796 pregnancies among women who used Accutane
were reported to the FDA . . . . Most ended in abortion or miscarriage, but the birth of
194 babies with defects caused by the drug were reported to the FDA. The actual
numbers are believed to be far higher . . . .”). The latest figures are, however, far less
encouraging. See Anti-Pregnancy Effort Fails, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at A10 (“The
new figures show the 122 pregnancies reported in the first year of the iPledge program
are about the same as the number reported annually before the FDA tightened
restrictions on the drug . . . .”).
21. See Gina Kolata, Europeans Placed Stiffer Curbs on Acne Drug, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1988, at A1 (adding that only three pregnancies had been reported in
isotretinoin users outside of North America). These sorts of marketing restrictions,
though imposed by the government, represent a type of “precommitment strategy” that
some commentators have endorsed as a mechanism for resolving disputes in connection
with reproductive decisionmaking. See John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies
for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989, 1046 (2001); cf. id. at 1022–23,
1041 (recognizing that precommitments requiring bodily intrusions at a future time
might be difficult to enforce); John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of
Procreative Liberty: A Response to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 259 n.95
(1995) (“In very extreme circumstances of compelling interest, forced abortion or
contraception might be appropriate, but such cases will be extremely rare.”); John A.
Robertson, Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (2003) (“[A
gestational surrogate] should not be specifically ordered to abort or undergo prenatal
tests. However, she could still be required to pay damages for the loss caused the couple
from violating her promise that she would screen . . . the fetus prior to birth and continue
(or terminate) the pregnancy . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., Gerber v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 907, 916–20
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that the 1983 warning was adequate as a matter of law
notwithstanding the failure to recommend the use of more than one form of
contraception); Hunt v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 547, 550 (D. Md. 1992)
(holding that the 1984 warning was adequate as a matter of law notwithstanding the
failure to recommend an initial pregnancy test); Bealer v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 729
F. Supp. 43, 44–45 (E.D. La. 1990) (holding, in a case where the patient underwent a
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who received a prescription for Accutane in 1995 (under the terms of the
PPP, including the completion of a detailed patient informed consent
form) sued for an alleged failure to warn after she had opted for
abstinence rather than contraception but then failed to remain celibate
and subsequently gave birth to a profoundly disabled child.23 In affirming
the trial judge’s decision to dismiss the complaint, the court explained:
“We cannot conclude that Roche had a duty to withhold from Ms.
Banner a medication her doctor determined was an appropriate treatment
for her unless she agreed to the use of contraceptive techniques that may
have violated her religious principles.”24 In another case, however, a
child born with birth defects recovered damages from a physician who
negligently had prescribed Accutane to an already pregnant woman and
failed to secure the patient’s written consent or follow other aspects of
the PPP.25
The FDA has approved a number of teratogenic drugs other than
isotretinoin and thalidomide, but it generally has not subjected these
drugs to the same distribution restrictions.26 For instance, a topical
therapeutic abortion after becoming pregnant, that the 1987 warning was adequate as a
matter of law); Felix v. Hoffmann–LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 103–05 (Fla. 1989)
(holding that the 1982 warning was adequate as a matter of law).
23. See Banner v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 891 A.2d 1229, 1231–33 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2006). “According to plaintiffs, Roche should have warned that all
women of child-bearing age who were married or sexually active should use two forms
of birth control, even if they indicated an intent not to engage in sexual activity while
taking Accutane.” Id. at 1234 (“Plaintiffs assert that Roche knew or should have known
that women of child-bearing age who were married or sexually active were unlikely to
remain abstinent.”); id. (“Plaintiffs also asserted that Roche was at fault for not
restricting the physicians authorized to prescribe Accutane. They pointed to a registry
program instituted by another pharmaceutical company, Celgene, in connection with that
company’s distribution of thalidomide . . . .”).
24. Id. at 1241; see also id. at 1237–40 (explaining that the warnings used in 1995
were adequate as a matter of law notwithstanding the inclusion of abstinence as an
alternative to using two forms of contraception).
25. See Hogle v. Hall, 916 P.2d 814, 816–17 (Nev. 1996) (noting that the medical
defendants had impleaded the mother as a joint tortfeasor and that the jury had allocated
40% of the responsibility to her for incorrectly informing the physician that she had just
experienced a menstrual period).
26. See Kathleen Uhl et al., Risk Management Strategies in the Physicians’ Desk
Reference Product Labels for Pregnancy Category X Drugs, 25 DRUG SAFETY 885, 887–
91 (2002) (reviewing the package inserts of more than 100 drugs contraindicated for use
during pregnancy, and finding that only thirteen included recommendations that
physicians conduct pregnancy testing, encourage the use of contraception, or both). In
addition, the FDA authorized the sale of a class of mild teratogens (nicotine replacement
products) without requiring either a prescription or consumer labeling that fully describes
the risk of use during pregnancy. See Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,
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retinoid for the treatment of acne and psoriasis (tazarotene) carries a
similar risk of birth defects (as revealed in its labeling) and
recommendations for pregnancy testing and contraceptive use, but it does
not include any special limitations on access.27 Tegison® (etretinate),
another vitamin A derivative for treating severe psoriasis, carried an
even higher risk of causing birth defects—in part because (unlike
isotretinoin) it persists long after a patient discontinues use, which would
necessitate long-acting contraception or sterilization—but faced no
distribution restrictions.28 The labeling for Tegison’s successor Soriatane®
(acitretin) does, however, include a risk management program similar to
that used for isotretinoin and thalidomide.29 The labeling for the antiviral
Rebetol® (ribavirin) recommends a negative pregnancy test as well as the
use of two contraceptives (and for both male and female patients)
continuing for six months after the cessation of this therapy for hepatitis C.30
The FDA also imposed restrictions on access when it approved the
controversial abortifacient Mifeprex® (mifepristone). Concerns existed
about birth defects in the event of product failure (which could, for
instance, happen if a pregnant woman ingested only the initial dose of
the drug but then changed her mind), so patients had to abide by a
protocol that included a follow-up visit for the administration of a
second drug (misoprostol) to complete the abortion.31 In effect, the
88 P.3d 1, 4–5, 15 (Cal. 2004) (holding that this decision preempted a contrary
warning requirement imposed under state law).
27. See Allergan, Tazorac® Package Insert (May 2004), http://www.tazorac. com/PDFs/
Tazorac_Cream_Full_PI.pdf. Similar recommendations appear in the labeling for Tracleer®
(bosentan), a treatment for primary pulmonary hypertension. See Actelion, Tracleer®
Package Insert (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.tracleer.com/pdf%5CPI_4pg_ TR2454_
032707_FINAL.pdf.
28. See Gina Kolata, A Second Skin Drug Is Called Major Threat for Birth
Defects, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1988, § 1, at 1. In 1999, after introducing Soriatane®
(acitretin), the manufacturer ceased marketing the drug and asked the FDA to withdraw
approval, which the agency did four years later. See FDA, Notice, Hoffmann-La Roche,
Inc.: Withdrawal of Approval of a New Drug Application, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,384, 53,385
(Sept. 10, 2003).
29. See Uhl et al., supra note 26, at 888–90.
30. See Schering Corp., Rebetol® Package Insert (July 2004), http://www.spfiles.
com/pirebetol.pdf.
31. See Noah, supra note 2, at 574–75 & n.12, 585–86; Gina Kolata, U.S.
Approves Abortion Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1 (“A woman will be given
written instructions . . . , and her doctor must sign a statement saying they have read the
instructions and will comply with them exactly.”); John Leland, Abortion Might
Outgrow Its Need for Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 4, at 14 (reporting that
the off-label use of the ulcer drug Cytotec® (misoprostol) alone may cause birth defects
if it fails to induce a miscarriage). The Patient Agreement for Mifeprex includes the
following statement: “I understand that if my pregnancy continues after any part of the
treatment [as happens in 5–8% of cases], there is a chance that there may be birth
defects. . . . I will talk with my provider about my choices, which may include a surgical
procedure to end my pregnancy.” Patient Agreement, Mifeprex (Mifepristone) Tablets
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agency decided that patients had to use these drugs in tandem. Along
similar lines, perhaps it makes sense to view hormonal contraceptives as
necessary concomitant treatments for women using other teratogens.32
Could the FDA go further still and, taking a cue from its British counterpart,
insist that women who become pregnant while using a teratogen take an
abortifacient drug?33 Or, instead of relying on agreements by patients
and physicians, could the agency demand that the manufacturer sell a
bundled product (for example, a single pill that combined a teratogen
with a hormonal contraceptive),34 at least when indicated for use by
female patients?35

(July 19, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/mifepristone/patientAgreement
20050719.pdf; cf. Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 830 N.E.2d 301, 303 (N.Y. 2005) (summarizing
tort claims brought on behalf of an infant whose mother declined to undergo a surgical
abortion after a nonsurgical abortion using the drug methotrexate failed and caused
serious birth defects).
32. Cf. Noah, supra note 3, at 644 (“[O]ne might view selective reduction as a
necessary adjunct to ARTs that may result in the implantation of multiple embryos.”).
Similar questions might arise in connection with other medical interventions (for
example, radiation and chemotherapy) that may cause permanent chromosomal damage
to a patient’s germ cells, which would make any subsequent efforts at procreation
inadvisable. Because these interventions also create a risk of infertility, patients
sometimes store reproductive tissues for future use before undergoing such treatments.
See Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous
Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 905 & n.16 (1997). Assuming that a treatment did not
cause infertility but might adversely affect a patient’s future children, could the
government insist on permanent contraception (that is, sterilization) as a condition of
access to the intervention?
33. Cf. Noah, supra note 2, at 576 (describing the range of abortifacient drugs
available in the United States); id. at 589 (explaining that “the labeling for one drug may
direct physicians to make use of another drug in order to counteract a particular side
effect”). Would-be fathers have no right to insist that a pregnant woman undergo an
abortion or, conversely, prevent her from doing so. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). In one publicized case, biological parents unsuccessfully
sought to insist that their surrogate comply with a contractual provision for selective
reduction when she developed a twin pregnancy. See New Parents Found for Surrogate’s
Twins, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at B7. See generally supra note 21 (discussing precommitment
strategies).
34. For instance, under government pressure to reduce the rampant abuse of
OxyContin® (oxycodone), the manufacturer announced plans to add an ingredient
(naltrexone) that could deactivate the opioid analgesic when crushed. See Lars Noah,
Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 55, 62 (2003); see also Sandra Blakeslee, Drug Makers Hope to Kill the Kick
in Pain Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at F1 (reporting that another approach
involves adding a chemical irritant such as capsaicin); Marc Kaufman, Drug Firms
Trying to Make Painkillers Less Abusable, WASH. POST, June 14, 2004, at A7 (noting
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III. CONDITIONS ON PROCREATION IN OTHER CONTEXTS
Two decades ago, in order to prevent perinatal transmission of the
AIDS virus, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced that
HIV-positive women should not become pregnant.36 Recognizing that
this recommendation would have only a limited impact, a few commentators
went further in suggesting mandatory screening of already pregnant
women,37 while some physicians evidently insisted that their infected
female patients remain abstinent:
Comments by health professionals to the effect that they will not provide
prenatal or other medical care to [HIV-positive] women who decide to bear children
constitute a more aggressive influence strategy. Although nowhere advocated
in print, such pressure may have been endemic in clinical practice. . . . The
reproductive forbearance requested might range from a promise not to become
pregnant to the use of a particular contraceptive method or even consent to
abortion. In addition, some have expressed concern about a more extreme
prospect—that providers could condition their services upon consent to
sterilization.38

that “some combination drugs that might reduce the abuse potential of painkillers are
also likely to reduce their effectiveness”).
35. Although rare, the FDA has approved certain drugs for use by only members
of one sex. See, e.g., FDA, Avodart Consumer Information (Nov. 22, 2002),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/consumerinfo/druginfo/avodart.htm (“Dutasteride is for men
only. . . . [W]omen who are pregnant or may be pregnant should not touch Avodart because
it can pass through their skin and may cause a birth defect in their male baby.”); Uhl et
al., supra note 26, at 887 (finding that almost a dozen drugs contraindicated during
pregnancy are intended for use only in males); Marc Kaufman, FDA Reapproves Bowel
Drug After Pulling It for Safety, WASH. POST, June 8, 2002, at A4 (reporting that
Lotronex is only approved for use by women). At least in the case of isotretinoin, such a
combination product would make additional sense because hormonal contraceptives also
help to treat acne in women. See Jane E. Brody, The Pill at 40: New Uses for a Drug
That Changed Society, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at F1 (“[O]ne product, Ortho TriCyclen, has received F.D.A. approval to treat moderate cystic acne in women 15 or older
who desire contraception and who have not been helped by topical acne remedies.”).
36. See CDC, Recommendations for Assisting in the Prevention of Perinatal
Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated
Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 721, 724–25 (1985); see also CDC, Childbearing and Contraceptive-Use Plans
Among Women at High Risk for HIV Infection, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
135, 144 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Carole A. Campbell, Women and AIDS, 30 SOC. SCI. & MED. 407,
410 (1990). In 1995, the government recommended the testing of all pregnant women.
See U.S. Public Health Service Recommendations for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Counseling and Voluntary Testing for Pregnant Women, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. RR-7 (1995).
38. M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Autonomy: Coercion and Morality in Clinical
Relationships, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 229, 239 (1996) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at
250–51, 255–56, 262–63, 300–01 (evaluating the legitimacy of such conditions); id. at
239–40 (“Additional influence strategies are possible at the public health level. These
range from the public promotion of reproductive abstinence via mass media campaigns
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In the face of suggestions that the government codify restrictions of this
sort, critics assailed such proposals as threatening an unconstitutional
interference with procreative liberties and intrusion upon bodily integrity.39
Could the FDA instead have made contraceptive use a condition of
access to AIDS drugs by women of childbearing years? Unlike proposals
for mandatory screening and sterilization of HIV-positive women,
patients theoretically would remain free to decline, but such a condition
on access seems more attenuated than in the case of teratogens because
the AIDS drugs themselves do not pose any risk of fetal injury.40 In any
event, with the advent of new treatments, including methods for reducing
the risk of perinatal transmission,41 the original reasons for discouraging
pregnancy in HIV-positive patients largely have disappeared.
Fifteen years ago, shortly after the FDA approved the long-acting
contraceptive implant Norplant® (levonorgestrel),42 controversy erupted
over proposed incentives designed to encourage its use by welfare
to the creation of financial and other material incentives to refrain from childbearing.”
(footnotes omitted)).
39. See John D. Arras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in
Fear and Trembling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353, 373 (1990); Suzanne Sangree, Control of
Childbearing by HIV Positive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41
BUFF. L. REV. 309, 395–414, 424–35 (1993) (assuming that “only” 30% of children
delivered by HIV-positive women would become infected in this manner); id. at 429
(predicting that, because of risks associated with intrauterine devices, “neither the[ir]
manufacturers nor the FDA would sanction the compulsory use of IUDs” by HIVpositive women); see also id. at 414–23, 435–41 (raising similar objections to proposals
for HIV screening of pregnant women).
40. Cf. Heather S. Dixon, Pelvic Exam Prerequisite to Hormonal Contraceptives:
Unjustified Infringement on Constitutional Rights, Governmental Coercion, and Bad
Public Policy, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 177, 209–17 (2004) (arguing that publicly funded
family planning clinics cannot condition access to oral contraceptives on intrusive exams
that serve only collateral purposes); id. at 216 (recognizing the peculiarity that “both the
right being exercised [bodily integrity] and the subject of the subsidy itself [access to
effective contraception] are constitutional entitlements”); id. at 231–32 (concluding that,
while physicians should discuss risks and separately might encourage a pelvic exam,
women retain the right to make an informed choice to use oral contraceptives without
first undergoing such an exam); Felicia H. Stewart et al., Clinical Breast and Pelvic
Examination Requirements for Hormonal Contraception, 285 JAMA 2232, 2236 (2001).
41. See Marc Santora, U.S. Is Close to Eliminating AIDS in Infants, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, § 1, at 1.
42. Products liability litigation ultimately helped to drive Norplant from the
marketplace. See Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling
Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 760 n.87 (2003).
Nonetheless, manufacturers continue to introduce new long-acting contraceptive drugs
and devices. See Shari Roan, Now, a Birth Control Bonanza, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2006,
at F1.
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recipients.43 A number of commentators assailed such plans as amounting
to unconstitutional conditions.44 After states failed to adopt proposals to
encourage contraceptive use by persons on welfare, a private organization
sponsored an initiative to reduce unwanted or hazardous pregnancies:
Project Prevention offered $200 to any substance abusers who opted for
a long-acting contraceptive.45 Although widely denounced for its methods
and message,46 no one seriously suggested that the program violated any
existing laws.
Separately, a few judges tried to make the implantation of Norplant a
condition of probation.47 Again, several commentators criticized such
43. See Tamar Lewin, 5-Year Contraceptive Implant Seems Headed for Wide Use,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1991, at A1 (describing proposals in Kansas and Louisiana); Adam
Pertman, Long-lasting Contraceptive Comes Under Fire, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1994,
at A3 (“Lawmakers have tried unsuccessfully in many states, including Maryland and
Connecticut, to provide monetary incentives for women on welfare to receive Norplant.”).
44. See, e.g., David S. Coale, Note, Norplant Bonuses and the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REV. 189, 204–15 (1992) (arguing that such programs
would intrude upon the constitutional rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and the free
exercise of religion); John Robert Hand, Note, Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of
Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 715, 718–23, 744–50 (1993) (focusing on the privacy objections, but cautioning
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may not come into play here); see also
AMA Bd. of Trustees, Requirements or Incentives by Government for the Use of LongActing Contraceptives, 267 JAMA 1818, 1821 (1992). But see Kimberly A. Smith,
Note, Conceivable Sterilization: A Constitutional Analysis of a Norplant/Depo-Provera
Welfare Condition, 77 IND. L.J. 389 (2002) (defending the constitutionality of supplemental
payments to encourage the use of long-acting contraceptives, distinguishing between
temporary and permanent sterilization).
45. See Jane Gilbert Mauldon, Providing Subsidies and Incentives for Norplant,
Sterilization and Other Contraception: Allowing Economic Theory to Inform Ethical
Analysis, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 354–55, 358–61 (2003) (describing and defending
this effort); Jennifer Mott Johnson, Note, Reproductive Ability for Sale, Do I Hear
$200?: Private Cash-for-Contraception Agreements As an Alternative to Maternal
Substance Abuse, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 223–43 (2001) (same, and distinguishing the
public policy concerns that have led to restrictions on surrogacy agreements between
private parties).
46. See Adam B. Wolf, Note, What Money Cannot Buy: A Legislative Response to
C.R.A.C.K., 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 173 (2000); Avram Goldstein, Group to Pay
Addicts to Take Birth Control, WASH. POST, June 26, 2000, at B1; Cecilia M. Vega,
Sterilization Offer to Addicts Reopens Ethics Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at B1. In
contrast, evidently no one has criticized an incentive program created by Planned
Parenthood to discourage second pregnancies by teenage girls. See Bonnie Steinbock,
Coercion and Long-Term Contraceptives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at
S19, S21–22 (applauding the “Dollar-a-Day” program in Denver); Dyan Zaslowsky,
Denver Program Curbs Teen-Agers’ Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1989, at A8.
47. See People v. Walsh, 593 N.W.2d 558, 558 (Mich. 1999) (Corrigan, J.,
concurring); Sally Jacobs, Norplant Draws Concerns over Risks, Coercion, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1992, at A1; Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews
Debate over Forced Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20; John Makeig,
Surgical Deterrent: Mom Convicted of Child Abuse Picks Birth-Control Implant over
Prison, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1992, at A1; see also Dee McAree, Deadbeat Dads Face
Ban on Procreation, NAT’L L.J., May 31, 2004, at 4 (reporting that a family court judge
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conditions on constitutional grounds.48 On those occasions where probationers
have challenged similar conditions (barring pregnancy though without
specifying a particular method of birth control), appellate courts generally
have rejected them as improper.49 In one case involving a mother prosecuted
for child endangerment based on her severe dietary restrictions, the court
accepted the need to prevent another pregnancy because of the risk of
prenatal injury, but it still invalidated the condition because other less
restrictive means existed to prevent injury in the event of a subsequent
pregnancy.50
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
If the constitutional objections lodged against other attempts to limit
procreation might have some merit, then the FDA’s conditions on access
to teratogenic drugs deserve closer scrutiny. Historically, this agency
has not paid much attention to statutory or constitutional obstacles that
in Kentucky had offered some fathers who were in contempt of child support orders the
option of vasectomies in lieu of spending a month in jail).
48. See, e.g., Janet F. Ginzberg, Note, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition
of Probation: The Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 1001–18 (1992)
(arguing that, notwithstanding the diminished constitutional protections afforded to
probationers, such a condition on probation for persons convicted of child abuse
unreasonably infringes upon rights related to privacy, procreation, and bodily integrity);
James H. Taylor, Note, Court-Ordered Contraception: Norplant as a Probation
Condition in Child Abuse, 44 FLA. L. REV. 379, 406–16 (1992); Kristyn M. Walker,
Note, Judicial Control of Reproductive Freedom: The Use of Norplant as a Condition of
Probation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 779, 797–807 (1993). But see Thomas E. Bartrum, Note,
Birth Control as a Condition of Probation—A New Weapon in the War Against Child
Abuse, 80 KY. L.J. 1037, 1047–53 (1992) (defending their constitutionality).
49. See, e.g., People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); State v.
Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Richard, 680 N.E.2d 667,
670 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004)
(invalidating probation condition for a deadbeat dad). But cf. In re Bobbijean P., No.
03626-03, 2004 WL 834480, at *2–3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004) (ordering the parents of
several crack babies to stop procreating); State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 698–99 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998) (involving a father convicted of child abuse); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d
200, 201–02 (Wis. 2001) (involving a father who refused to pay child support).
50. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364–65 & n.9 (Ct. App. 1984); see
also Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or
Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 69–83 (1992) (questioning the latter aspect of the
court’s decision, and documenting subsequent acts of child endangerment that would not
have occurred had the defendant used contraceptives during her probationary period); cf.
People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 265, 271 (Ct. App. 1992) (invalidating a
condition designed to prevent a heroin abuser from having an addicted baby); Trammell
v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 285–86, 290–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating condition
imposed after neglect by mentally retarded mother caused child’s death).
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stand in the way of pursuing its mission to protect the public health,51
and perhaps no one would ever actually try to test the validity of these
distribution restrictions, but their lawfulness remains very much in doubt.
A. Finding State Action
Would a requirement making contraception a prerequisite for access to
a prescription drug survive a constitutional challenge? As a threshold
matter, anyone wishing to mount such a challenge would have to find
some “state action” underlying the condition.52 If a nongovernmental
entity imposed the condition, then constitutional constraints become
inapplicable, though statutes may impose parallel limitations on private
actors.53 In other words, the Constitution would not prevent a physician
in private practice from adopting a policy of prescribing Accutane (or
some other teratogen) only if a patient first agreed to use contraceptives
(or to undergo an abortion in the event of a pregnancy).54 Similarly, the
51. See Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in
Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1488 (2000); Lars Noah, What’s
Wrong with “Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law”?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 137, 144 &
n.39, 148 (2000).
52. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,
295–96 (2001) (summarizing the factors considered by the Court); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (“[O]ur precedents indicate that a State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in
law be deemed to be that of the State.”); id. at 1005–12 (holding that decisions made by
private nursing homes to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients did not qualify as state
action even though subject to extensive regulation); Gilliam E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1410–21, 1446–52 (2003); id. at 1417 (noting
“the Court’s prime insistence on government involvement in specific challenged acts”);
id. at 1420 (“No doubt, the Supreme Court will clamp down when it perceives an effort
by government to evade its constitutional obligations.”).
53. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, would apply. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499
U.S. 187, 190, 192, 199, 211 (1991) (holding that a private employer could not exclude
non-sterile female employees from work involving exposure to lead because of possible
fetal harms); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268, 1271–72, 1276–
77 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that a health insurer could not exclude coverage for
contraceptives); Mary E. Becker, Can Employers Exclude Women to Protect Children?,
264 JAMA 2113 (1990). But see In re Union Pac. R.R. Employ. Prac. Litig., 479 F.3d
936 (8th Cir. 2007) (disagreeing with the holding in Erickson).
54. See Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 611, 613 (4th Cir. 1977) (no state action
where a physician insisted on sterilizing patients); see also Lawrence K. Altman,
Medical Dilemma: Necessary Drugs with Intolerable Dangers, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1988, at C3 (“Many doctors also demand agreement from a patient before prescribing the
drug that she would terminate a pregnancy that occurred while using it, although, of
course, this could not be enforced.”); cf. supra note 38 and accompanying text
(discussing a similar practice in connection with HIV-positive female patients). At least
one state statute governing fertility procedures prohibits such conditions. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1(D) (Supp. 2006) (providing that “no physician may stipulate that
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Constitution would not prevent a pharmaceutical company from adopting a
policy of supplying Accutane (or some other teratogen) only if a physician
first agreed to adopt and enforce such a policy.55 If, however, a government
agency directed a pharmaceutical company to proceed in such a fashion,
then constitutional constraints would come into play.56
Although it appears that the FDA ordered the manufacturers of isotretinoin
and thalidomide to implement restrictive distribution systems, the
agency undoubtedly would argue that the companies took the initiative
and “voluntarily” created the programs in question. After all, the FDA lacks
any delegated statutory authority to impose such conditions. Nonetheless, it
enjoys plenty of leverage to secure concessions from sponsors of new
drugs when they apply for a marketing license,57 and courts might look
beneath the surface to find state action in these cases. The long history
behind the Accutane restrictions, for instance, clearly indicates that the
FDA pressured the manufacturer to adopt the increasingly burdensome
conditions on access.58
In the alternative, the agency might take the position that, even if it
effectively had ordered the companies to adopt these restrictions, it has
no direct power to enforce them. In the event of widespread noncompliance
by physicians, pharmacists, or patients, the FDA could threaten to

a woman must abort in the event the pregnancy should produce a deformed or
handicapped child”).
55. Cf. Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1326–27 (S.D. Miss. 2003)
(rejecting drug manufacturers’ effort to remove tort claims to federal court on the theory
that they acted under the direction of federal officers); id. at 1326 (“[D]efendants
have established only that they are participants in a highly regulated industry. . . . [T]hey
are for-profit corporations that do not derive their primary income from federal
funding . . . [, and they] do not operate as a public utility under the direct control of the
federal government.”). But cf. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 420 F.3d 852 (8th Cir.
2005) (allowing removal on such a theory), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2301 (2007).
56. Cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–15 (1989)
(holding that federal rules specifying when and how private railroads must test their
employees for substance abuse qualified as state action); Doe v. Charleston Area Med.
Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642–44 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that a private hospital’s policy
against performing abortions satisfied state action requirements insofar as it was derived
from a now unconstitutional state criminal statute).
57. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 881–82. In a recent op-ed piece, a
former FDA official who had just left his post as deputy commissioner explained that
risk management plans “already guide the use of about 30 marketed drugs as part of
‘voluntary’ arrangements with drug companies.” Scott Gottlieb, Prescription for
Trouble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2007, at A19.
58. See supra notes 6–20 and accompanying text.
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withdraw the manufacturer’s license to sell the drug, but it could take no
action against noncompliant providers or users.59 Once again, however,
courts may find state action based on the agency’s indirect power to
encourage the private manufacturer to take steps to enforce the conditions
on access. Otherwise, nothing other than a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s
willingness to resist the FDA’s pressure would stand as an obstacle to
the government’s ability to impose arguably unreasonable restrictions on
patient access to drugs.
These questions also may arise in connection with restrictive enrollment
criteria for clinical trials of investigational products. Putting aside research
initiated or sponsored by federal funding agencies (which would simplify
the state action issue), when a private entity (pharmaceutical company or
academic institution) undertakes clinical trials of a potential teratogen, it
may insist that women of childbearing age agree to undergo an abortion
in the event of contraceptive failure. Apparently this had happened in
the testing of isotretinoin.60 Although the FDA first must grant an application
for an investigational new drug (IND) exemption, it plays a largely
passive role at this stage of the research and development process, so
any such restrictions would have originated with the sponsor.61 In
59. See Noah, supra note 2, at 586, 592 n.99, 594; Marc Kaufman, Death After
Abortion Pill Reignites Safety Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at A3 (reporting that
the distribution restrictions for mifepristone have not been enforced); see also Planned
Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006) (invalidating a state
law that attempted to prevent the off-label use of mifepristone at lower dosages or later
in pregnancy). But cf. Doshi, supra note 9, at 659, 660 (assuming incorrectly that the
FDA could sanction isotretinoin users who failed to comply with the restrictions). This
stands in stark contrast to the powers exercised by the Drug Enforcement Administration
over controlled substances. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in
Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 177–85 (2004).
60. See Nancy Blodgett, Acne Control vs. Birth Defects: Accutane Spurs Lawsuits,
Called Thalidomide of the ’80s, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1988, at 17, 18 (reporting that some
research sites had excluded women while others insisted that female subjects agree to
undergo an abortion in the event of contraceptive failure).
61. See FDA, Investigational New Drug Applications; Amendment to Clinical
Hold Regulations for Products Intended for Life-Threatening Diseases and Conditions,
65 Fed. Reg. 34,963, 34,965 (June 1, 2000). The agency has issued guidelines that
address the inclusion of women who might become pregnant. See FDA, Guideline for
the Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58
Fed. Reg. 39,406, 39,407–08 (July 22, 1993) (discussing its 1977 policy that had called
for the exclusion of women of childbearing age from early phases of studies with
investigational drugs); id. at 39,410 (rescinding this policy); id. at 39,411 (“[C]linical
protocols should also include measures that will minimize the possibility of fetal
exposure to the investigational drug. These would ordinarily include providing for the
use of a reliable method of contraception (or abstinence) for the duration of drug
exposure (which may exceed the length of the study) . . . .”). The agency’s guidelines
have no binding effect, however. See id. at 39,409; id. at 39,408 (“The agency
recognizes that this change in FDA’s policy will not, by itself, cause drug companies or
IRBs to alter restrictions they might impose on the participation of women of
childbearing potential.”). In contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services
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addition, local institutional review boards (IRBs) must approve an
experimental protocol before a clinical trial gets under way, but these
entities generally also do not qualify as state actors.62 Thus, notwithstanding
legitimate objections to the tradition of excluding women of childbearing
age from clinical trials,63 persons denied the opportunity to enroll as
subjects in privately sponsored research presumably could not invoke
constitutional protections against discrimination.64

revised its regulations governing federally-funded biomedical research to encourage
greater inclusion of women in clinical trials. See HHS, Protection of Human Research
Subjects, 66 Fed. Reg. 3878 (Jan. 17, 2001) (amending 45 C.F.R. pt. 46(B)). See
generally Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and
Women’s Health Care, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1222–41, 1267–70 (1996).
62. See Missert v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 73 F. Supp. 2d 68, 70–73 (D. Mass. 1999)
(dismissing constitutional claims asserted by a graduate student who was dismissed from
a dentistry program where he premised state action solely on the federal requirements for
IRB review of research that he had done for his thesis); Lars Noah, Deputizing
Institutional Review Boards to Police (Audit?) Biomedical Research, 25 J. LEGAL MED.
267, 276–79 & n.43 (2004). For the most part, private health care facilities also need not
fear constitutional claims. See Annotation, Action of Private Hospital as State Action
Under 42 USCS § 1983 or Fourteenth Amendment, 42 A.L.R. FED. 463, § 18(b) (1979 &
Supp. 2006).
63. See Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 24, 25 (“The possibility that a few women
might become pregnant [after contraceptive failure], might choose against abortion, and
might have a child who is harmed by exposure to an experimental intervention is too
small to justify the current exclusionary practices.”); id. at 26 (arguing that, even if it
made sense to exclude women of childbearing age from clinical trials involving potential
teratogens that offer little promise of therapeutic benefit, fertile men should be excluded
as well given the possibility of birth defects transmitted by sperm); Vanessa Merton, The
Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) from
Biomedical Research, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369 (1993); L. Elizabeth Bowles, Note, The
Disenfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The Legal Ramifications of and
Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 VAND. L. REV. 877, 895–907 (1992)
(emphasizing this same point about the differential treatment of fertile male and female
subjects in the course of trying to craft an Equal Protection objection to the FDA’s
previous policy); id. at 909–10 (favoring a policy that would make contraception a
condition of participation); Kathy George, UW to Study Prenatal Drug Use: Safety of
Medicines for Pregnant Women a Neglected Research Area, S EATTLE P OST INTELLIGENCER, July 26, 2004, at B1.
64. See R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us to Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical
Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 135, 166–67 (1993). But see Rothenberg, supra
note 61, at 1246 n.296, 1251–52 n.328; cf. Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp.,
Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a private hospital would have to establish
a medical justification for its policy of excluding pregnant women from a drug treatment
program to sustain it against a gender discrimination charge asserted under state statute);
Megan R. Golden, Note, When Pregnancy Discrimination Is Gender Discrimination:
The Constitutionality of Excluding Pregnant Women from Drug Treatment Programs, 66
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B. Identifying the Rights at Stake
After satisfying the state action prerequisite for invoking the Constitution,
someone seeking to challenge the FDA’s access restrictions would need
to identify the right(s) at stake. Until recently, courts consistently
had rejected claims that persons had any special right of access to
pharmaceutical products. Although patients enjoyed an interest in making
choices about their medical care, the government could decline to allow
the sale of drugs until the manufacturer proved their safety and effectiveness.
In 2006, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held
that terminally ill patients sufficiently alleged that they enjoyed a
fundamental right of access to promising therapeutic agents in advance
of final approval, which meant that the FDA would have to demonstrate
that its contrary policy represented the least restrictive means for serving
a compelling governmental interest.65 As suggested in the accompanying
dissent,66 the court’s astonishing decision represents a departure from the
Supreme Court’s cautionary guidance about discovering new fundamental
rights imbedded in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.67
In contrast, the courts repeatedly have recognized fundamental rights
involving procreative choices.68 Although normally framed as rights of
access to contraceptives or abortions,69 the right to decline such interventions
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1832, 1867–68 (1991) (arguing that the policy challenged in Elaine W.
grew from state action for purposes of bringing a federal constitutional challenge).
65. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006) (granting rehearing en banc).
66. See id. at 486 (Griffith, J., dissenting); see also Raich v. Gonzales, No. 0315481, 2007 WL 754759, at *8-12 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007) (rejecting due process claim
for access to medical marijuana); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to
Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 994 (2002) (“[W]henever the government imposes
barriers on the use of some medicine or medical technology, there is a disproportionate
burden on those who believe that they need it. By itself that burden is not enough to
create a serious constitutional issue.”). Shortly after the court granted a motion for
rehearing en banc, the agency proposed amendments to liberalize its rules. See FDA,
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147 (Dec.
14, 2006); FDA, Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168 (Dec. 14,
2006); Rob Stein, FDA Reveals Plan for Wider Access to Experimental Drugs, WASH.
POST, Dec. 12, 2006, at A10.
67. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). See
generally Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63 (2006); Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process
Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2006).
68. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–66, 573–74 (2003); Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (“A woman’s decision to conceive or to bear a
child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
69. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right to privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
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seems even more straightforward and far less controversial.70 The issue
becomes clearer still if the contraceptive method requires implantation
and functions over a relatively long period of time, which would represent a
form of temporary sterilization. Notwithstanding the failure to overrule
some of the older decisions upholding early twentieth century eugenics
legislation, most observers doubt that state-mandated sterilization programs
would survive today.71 After all, even without any procreative overtones,
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). For this reason, some commentators have questioned predictions that the Court
would extend the right to include novel reproductive strategies. See Marsha Garrison,
Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 854–59 (2000); Note, Human Cloning and Substantive
Due Process, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2354 (1998) (“Despite the Court’s occasional
references to a broader principle of reproductive freedom, the Court has not truly tested a
right to procreate.” (footnote omitted)).
70. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (“The decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child . . . holds a particularly important place in the
history of the right of privacy. . . . [The] decision whether to accomplish or prevent
conception [is] among the most private and sensitive.”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[If] a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is
valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would
seem to be valid. In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude
upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected.”). As the Court later
explained:
The soundness of this [procreative liberty] prong of the Roe analysis is apparent
from a consideration of the alternative. If indeed the woman’s interest in
deciding whether to bear and beget a child had not been recognized as in Roe,
the State might as readily restrict a woman’s right to choose to carry a
pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in
population control, or eugenics, for example. Yet Roe has been sensibly relied
upon to counter any such suggestions.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992).
71. See Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws:
Providing Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 862, 866–84 (2004) (tracing the judiciary’s failure to overrule Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), which had upheld a state’s authority to sterilize the “feebleminded,” but arguing that such laws unconstitutionally interfere with fundamental rights
associated with procreation subsequently recognized by the Court); see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539–41 (1942) (invalidating a statute authorizing sterilization
of habitual offenders, recognizing a fundamental right to procreate but basing the
decision on Equal Protection grounds because it drew arbitrary distinctions among
crimes that could lead to this sanction); Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the
Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 7–8, 24 (1996); Mike Anton, Forced Sterilization Once Seen as
Path to a Better World, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A1. After all, persons may qualify
for political asylum in the U.S. when they flee other countries (such as China) because of
population control policies that include state-ordered abortion and sterilization. See 8
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persons enjoy rights of bodily integrity that would allow them to decline
unwanted medical interventions unless the state had some powerful
justification.72 Even if a pregnancy might imperil a woman’s life, it
would be hard to imagine the state having any compelling reason for
mandating the use of contraception in the face of a competent patient’s
refusal.73
The First Amendment also might come into play. After all, objections
to contraception and abortion often spring from strongly held religious
beliefs. Nonetheless, the FDA’s access restrictions offer patients the
alternative of agreeing to remain abstinent, and, even if the government
decided to eliminate that option (or, to pose the issue in starker terms,
insisted on an abortion in the event of pregnancy), the Free Exercise
Clause does not require state actors to craft special exceptions to laws of
general application.74 Separately, some physicians and pharmacists may
object on First Amendment grounds, complaining that the government
compels them to distribute information recommending the use of
contraceptives (which might offend their religious scruples even if
abstinence remains an alternative) or else lose the opportunity to prescribe
and dispense certain teratogenic drugs. The coerced speech argument
has not, however, succeeded in similar medical settings (though lacking
the overlay of the provider’s or recipient’s religious objections).75
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2000); Megan C. Dempsey, Note, A Misplaced Bright-Line
Rule: Coercive Population Control in China and Asylum for Unmarried Partners, 92
IOWA L. REV. 213, 216–20 (2006).
72. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); cf. Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210 (1990) (recognizing, however, that the state may have a valid competing
interest where the patient is in its custody as a prison inmate).
73. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing that
the state may have a valid competing interest where the patient lacks the capacity to
decide whether to refuse life-sustaining care).
74. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (rejecting a free
exercise claim by a Native American employee fired after ingesting peyote, a Schedule I
hallucinogenic substance); see also Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details:
Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045 (2000). Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in an effort to
resurrect the strict scrutiny previously recognized under the free exercise clause. See,
e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
(holding that the government had failed to demonstrate that its asserted interest in the
uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act was sufficiently compelling to
justify a prohibition on the sacramental use of hoasca, a tea containing the Schedule I
hallucinogen dimethyltryptamine, in part because the federal government has long made
an exception for the use of peyote by Native Americans).
75. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (“All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion,
and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. . . . We see no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the
State here.”). Scholars have critiqued the Court’s analysis. See, e.g., Paula Berg,
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In the past few years, “conscientious objection” by pharmacists in
refusing to dispense contraceptives has attracted a great deal of attention.
Some state legislatures have protected such choices while others have
attempted to prohibit this sort of behavior.76 Other health care professionals
undoubtedly can decline to prescribe contraceptives or assist with
abortions,77 and patients who share in these views may find such environments
more appealing, while other patients would remain free to seek out
family planning services elsewhere.78 The FDA’s access restrictions
might, however, effectively prevent such conscientious objectors from

Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive
Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 224–25, 235–43, 247–50, 256–65
(1994); id. at 266 (“[R]egulations that compel physician speech may subvert patients’
audience-based interests if they . . . advance a particular viewpoint regarding medical
treatment or how a patient should respond to a certain diagnosis . . . .”); id. at 250 n.242
(“For example, patients who oppose the use of artificial contraception would likely feel
trapped and offended if forced to listen to their physician deliver a speech expressing the
government’s view that women ought to practice artificial birth control.”).
76. See, e.g., Rob Stein, A Medical Crisis of Conscience: Faith Drives Some to
Refuse Patients Medication or Care, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006, at A1; Rob Stein,
Health Workers’ Choice Debated: Proposals Back Right Not to Treat, WASH. POST, Jan.
30, 2006, at A1; see also Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992 (C.D. Ill. 2006)
(allowing pharmacists to challenge a state regulation requiring them to dispense
emergency contraceptives). See generally Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of
Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency
Contraception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008 (2004); Melissa Duvall, Comment,
Pharmacy Conscience Clause Statutes: Constitutional Religious “Accommodations” or
Unconstitutional “Substantial Burdens” on Women?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1485 (2006);
Jed Miller, Note, The Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists’ Consciences
and Women’s Access to Contraception, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 237 (2006).
77. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care
Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (1993) (surveying “conscience clauses” enacted in the
states, and editorializing that these laws generally do not go far enough in securing the
rights of conscientious objectors); id. at 180 (finding that “45 American jurisdictions
provide at least some protection for some health care providers to decline to provide or
perform some abortions, 10 states cover contraception, [and] seven jurisdictions include
sterilization”); Natalie Langlois, Note, Life-Sustaining Treatment Law: A Model for
Balancing a Woman’s Reproductive Rights with a Pharmacist’s Conscientious
Objection, 47 B.C. L. REV. 815, 825–32 (2006); Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of
Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1707–17 (1999).
78. See Rob Stein, Medical Practices Blend Health and Faith: Doctors, Patients
Distance Themselves from Care They Consider Immoral, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2006, at
A1 (describing the emergence of “natural family planning” clinics that reject any use of
contraceptives); see also Rob Stein, Institute Practices Reproductive Medicine—and
Catholicism, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2006, at A14.
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ever selecting—and perhaps their patients from ever even learning
about79—teratogenic drugs available to treat a disease or other condition.
C. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Even if someone seeking to challenge the access restrictions
succeeded in asserting that they enjoyed some fundamental right, they
would still have to establish that state action threatened to deprive them
of the opportunity to exercise this right. The state has not, for instance,
ordered contraception for (or sterilization of) persons likely to transmit
infectious or genetic diseases.80 Moreover, the FDA has not told women
of childbearing age that they can never use these teratogenic drugs;
instead, it has insisted that they promise to avoid becoming pregnant
before using such drugs. A person seeking to challenge such a requirement
would have to invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which
asks whether the government inappropriately demands that an individual
forego exercising a constitutionally protected right in order to secure
access to a benefit.
The doctrine recognizes that, even without coercion, persons often
face seriously constrained choices and that the government’s offer of
some benefit may encourage waivers of their rights without valid
consent. The U.S. Supreme Court has employed the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in resolving challenges to state denials of unemployment
benefits to individuals who decline to work on their sabbath,81 state

79. See Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical
Practices, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 593, 597 (2007) (“If physicians’ ideas translate into
their practices, then 14% of patients—more than 40 million Americans—may be cared
for by physicians who do not believe they are obligated to disclose information about
medically available treatments they consider objectionable.”).
80. See John A. Robertson, Norplant and Irresponsible Reproduction, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at S23, S25 (“At present this discussion is largely
hypothetical, because no one has proposed that HIV-positive women or those at genetic
risk should be penalized for reproduction or failure to accept Norplant.”); see also John
A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697, 716 (1990)
(doubting that the government could mandate genetic screening); Sonia Mateu Suter, The
Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 269 (2002) (arguing that, as
voluntary genetic screening has become routine, “a new, more subtle form of eugenics is
currently emerging at the individual level”); cf. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Scientists Debate
China’s Law on Sterilizing the Carriers of Genetic Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998,
§ 1, at 14. If screening for homozygous recessive conditions such as cystic fibrosis, Tay
Sachs disease, or sickle-cell anemia revealed that both potential parents were carriers,
then they would have a 25% chance of bearing a child suffering from such a disease,
which does not differ appreciably from the risk of serious birth defects that the FDA
thought necessitated contraception when using certain teratogenic drugs.
81. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 146
(1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357
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prohibitions on office-holding by ministers,82 and federal restrictions on
editorializing as a condition for receiving public broadcasting subsidies.83
Because of its inconsistent application by the Court, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention.84
Commentators have suggested a number of competing formulations,85
but the Supreme Court has not explicitly embraced any of these approaches.86
What if the government demanded contraceptive use as a condition of
Medicaid reimbursement for drugs that create a risk of birth defects?87
In fact, Medicare has begun to insist that beneficiaries seeking coverage
of certain medical devices agree to participate in post-approval safety
and efficacy studies.88 The Medicaid condition hypothesized here

U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958) (holding that the denial of a state tax exemption to persons
advocating the overthrow of the government represented an unconstitutional condition).
82. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626–29 (1978) (plurality opinion).
83. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399–401 (1984).
84. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, Another View
of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 913 (2006).
85. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989) (canvassing several different theories based on notions of coercion, corruption,
and commodification, and offering instead a “systemic” theory calling for strict scrutiny
of rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits because they skew the distribution
of power between and among the government and the governed).
86. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1195 (1990) (noting that all
recent commentators concede that “the Court has yet to arrive, explicitly or implicitly, at
a clear limiting principle for deciding challenges to conditions on government benefits”).
87. Cf. Judy Berlfein, Genetic Testing: Health Care Trap, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1990, at B2 (reporting that an HMO threatened to drop a pregnant woman’s coverage
after she received a positive prenatal test for cystic fibrosis unless she underwent an
abortion).
88. See Gina Kolata, Medicare Covering New Treatments, but with a Catch, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A1; Rick Weiss, Medicare to Cover Cardiac Device: Plan
Raises Issue of Line Between Care and Research, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2005, at A1
(explaining that this “represents the most aggressive effort yet to use the federal
insurance plan for the elderly as a backdoor way to learn more about what works and
what does not in medicine”); see also Steven D. Pearson et al., Medicare’s Requirement
for Research Participation as a Condition of Coverage: Is It Ethical?, 296 JAMA 988
(2006) (defending this approach). In fact, the isotretinoin and thalidomide registration
requirements operate in much the same fashion by enrolling patients in an
epidemiological study of pregnancy rates and outcomes. See Michael Kranish, New
Use Is Found for Thalidomide: Fighting Cancer, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2002, at A28
(reporting objections that BU’s initial policing role under STEPS was unduly coercive);
supra note 13; see also FDA, General Information About Pregnancy Exposure
Registries, http://www.fda.gov/womens/registries (last visited Apr. 30, 2007); Honein et
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unmistakably involves state action, though it looks more like a nonsubsidy
than a penalty because a woman receiving public assistance for drug
coverage would remain free (in theory) to refuse contraception and pay
for the drug out of pocket.89 The actual condition of access imposed by
the FDA operates more strongly, however, than a simple government
decision not to subsidize use of a particular drug.
If courts began to view access to therapeutic agents as protected by the
Constitution, then contraception requirements would amount to a double
whammy, forcing patients to choose which of two fundamental rights to
sacrifice in order to secure the other right.90 Furthermore, if access to
therapeutic agents qualified as a fundamental right, then the differential
impact of contraception as a condition of access might pose Equal
Protection questions.91 The concern becomes even clearer if the agency
adopted a broader restriction linked to the patient’s sex (for example,
altogether prohibiting use by women of childbearing years, as often
happens in clinical trials with investigational new drugs that may cause
birth defects).92 Because gender only qualifies as a quasi-suspect
classification triggering heightened scrutiny, however, the government
probably would manage to justify such restrictions.93
D. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Lastly, even if (indirect) state action (indirectly) threatens to infringe
upon some fundamental right(s), the constitutional inquiry allows the
government to try and justify its action. If strict scrutiny applied, the
al., supra note 16, at 1073 (discussing a pregnancy registry for antiepileptic drugs); Uhl
et al., supra note 26, at 890.
89. Cf. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (holding that the
state cannot deny a benefit (for example, access to medical care) because an otherwise
eligible person had exercised a fundamental right (to travel, for example)).
90. See supra note 40 (making a similar point in connection with pelvic exams as a
condition for access to contraceptives).
91. For instance, women with cystic acne would face a difficult choice not forced
on men with the same disease (even if the patient’s male partner might have to use a
contraceptive in order to satisfy the condition). In contrast, for drugs such as
thalidomide that have teratogenic potential whether used by a male or female patient, the
government would have drawn no classification based on sex.
92. Cf. January W. Payne, Forever Pregnant: Guidelines—Treat Nearly All
Women as Pre-Pregnant, WASH. POST, May 16, 2006, at F1 (discussing new CDC
recommendations for “preconception care” designed to ensure that all women who might
become pregnant adhere to prenatal care guidelines during the window of time before
confirmation of pregnancy).
93. Cf. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533–34 (1996) (“The heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not
make sex a proscribed classification. . . . But such classifications may not be used . . . to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”); Bray v.
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993).
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agency would need to demonstrate that its conditions on access represented
the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling governmental
interest.94 State actors rarely prevail once a court decides to use strict
scrutiny,95 though usually because they struggle to satisfy the least
restrictive means requirement. In the case of teratogenic drugs, however
(and somewhat counterintuitively), the ends prong may be trickier: even
though the state may seek to minimize the risks of in utero exposure to
teratogens, the state may not have a compelling interest in preventing the
birth of a child so exposed.96 If it did, then the least restrictive means
prong should not pose much of a problem. After all, at least in the case
of Accutane, the FDA proceeded deliberately (some would say too
slowly), incrementally adding ever more burdensome conditions on
access after it realized that the previous effort had not worked as well as
hoped.
Some scholars have taken the position that safeguarding unconceived
offspring from the risk of fetal injuries would not qualify as a
compelling interest because children born with unavoidable birth defects
are still better off alive.97 This view coincides with the judicial hostility
94. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (“[W]here
a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations
imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be
narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”).
95. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–09, 869–71 (2006)
(summarizing the conventional wisdom about strict scrutiny, but finding that in recent
years, depending on various circumstances, some laws survive the test).
96. Cf. Charo, supra note 64, at 154 (“Even if excluding pregnant women
intending to go to term from all nontherapeutic research can be justified on the grounds
of fetal protection, excluding all fertile but not currently pregnant women certainly
cannot . . . .”).
97. See Jan C. Heller, Religious Perspectives on Human Cloning: Revisiting Safety
as a Moral Constraint, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 663–69, 676–77 (1998) (referring to this
paradox as the problem of the “contingent future person”); John A. Robertson, Embryos,
Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 939, 987–93 (1986); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human
Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371, 1405–08 (1998); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 435
(1983); Michael H. Shapiro, How (Not) to Think About Surrogacy and Other
Reproductive Innovations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 647, 672–73 (1994). In an article that
proposed restricting access to fertility drugs, I argued that this premise did not apply to
avoidable prenatal injuries caused by multifetal pregnancies. See Noah, supra note 3, at
659–65; see also Dan W. Brock, Procreative Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REV. 187, 202–05
(1995) (book review) (criticizing Professor Robertson’s claim that any harm done to
children born through assisted reproductive technologies would not justify state
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to “wrongful life” claims brought on behalf of such children.98 A physician
may face liability for neglecting to disclose the teratogenic potential of a
prescribed drug, but the courts in such cases assume that the risk
information would have caused the patient to avoid using the drug rather
than to avoid becoming pregnant (hence, an avoidable birth defect).99
Thus, if a physician prescribed isotretinoin to a woman of childbearing
years without revealing the risk of congenital abnormalities, then the
physician has breached the duty to secure informed consent and may
face liability for the resulting injuries to the child. If, however, the
physician fully disclosed the risk but allegedly failed to take reasonable
steps to ensure that the patient would not become pregnant, then courts
would not allow recovery for any injuries to the child.100
Under that view, the FDA has a legitimate interest in ensuring that
pharmaceutical manufacturers accurately disclose the teratogenic potential
of drug products but does not have a compelling interest that would
justify taking additional steps designed to prevent the conception and
birth of children by a woman after she has decided to use such a drug.
In making risk-benefit judgments and labeling decisions, the FDA
routinely takes into account the possibility of adverse impacts on the

interference); Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm
One’s Child Genetically, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 10 (1997); Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability, and Reproductive Technology,
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 487, 508–19, 524, 546–48 (1989).
98. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682 (Ky.
2003); Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115–23 (Md. 2002); id. at 1116–17
(explaining that twenty-eight other states had rejected wrongful life claims while only
three had allowed limited recovery in such cases); Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161
(Ohio 2000); Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 2004). But cf. Harbeson v. Parke Davis,
Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 523–25 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs on an
informed consent claim where the physicians had failed to advise an epilepsy patient of
the teratogenicity of Dilantin after she specifically had inquired about such risks in order
to decide whether to attempt to conceive).
99. See, e.g., Hogle v. Hall, 916 P.2d 814, 816–17 (Nev. 1996) (Accutane).
100. In one recent Accutane case, the court drew precisely this distinction:
Given that Mr. Gerber cannot recover on a theory that, had Roche provided
certain precautions, he would not have been born, Mr. Gerber can only argue
that Shirley Gerber would not have taken Accutane in the first place if Roche’s
warning had been adequate. In order to prove causation under the circumstances
presented in this case, Plaintiff must demonstrate that an alternative warning would
have changed the physician’s decision to prescribe Accutane or would have altered
Shirley Gerber’s decision to take the drug for her severe acne condition.
Gerber v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 907, 920 (S.D. Tex. 2005); id. at
921 (“A different warning may have altered Shirley Gerber’s birth control plan to better
avoid pregnancy, but, as noted above, the net result of this argument is that Plaintiff
would not have been born, a ‘wrongful life’ theory which is not cognizable in Texas.”);
see also Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (“If her parents had decided to
conceive, despite knowledge of probable congenital defects, the law would recognize no
action on Christy’s behalf against them.”).
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unborn.101 Thus, if the agency decided to withdraw its approval of a
teratogen, then (putting aside the possibility of a constitutional right of
drug access) disappointed patients probably would have no constitutional
grounds for objecting.102 The greater power does not, however, invariably
include the lesser power to condition access on the forfeiture of a
patient’s constitutional rights.103 If preventing the birth of injured children
does not qualify as a compelling interest, then the FDA’s access restrictions
would amount to unconstitutional conditions.104
101. See Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Regulating (for the Benefit of) Future
Persons: A Different Perspective on the FDA’s Jurisdiction to Regulate Human
Reproductive Cloning, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1222–27; id. at 1221–22 (“[A]s far
back as 1962, there has been a tacit presumption that the FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction
over articles intended ‘for use in man’ includes both current and future persons, and that
its mandate extends to protecting the safety of future persons who may be exposed to a
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V. CONCLUSION
Who can argue with the goal of avoiding prenatal injuries, and who
can fail to appreciate the FDA’s frustration over the seeming inability of
users to guard against becoming pregnant when taking a drug that poses
a serious risk of teratogenicity? Even so, the agency may have crossed a
constitutional line when it in effect required that patients first agree to
use contraceptives as a condition of access to one of these drugs. If
anyone ever challenged this risk management strategy, a court would
have to decide whether the policy grew out of state action, involved the
exercise of a fundamental right, inappropriately conditioned access to a
benefit on the waiver of one of these rights, and failed to serve a
compelling governmental interest. Each of these steps in the analysis
has undoubted weaknesses, and perhaps in the aggregate they would
defeat an effort to challenge the distribution restrictions on constitutional
grounds. Nonetheless, the FDA’s recent efforts to impose such conditions
raise serious enough questions about burdening procreative rights that
these initiatives deserve closer attention than they have received to this
point.

test would deprive the patient of access to the drug rather than force the patient to forego
the right to become pregnant once on the drug. Conversely, labeling that urged patients
to consider an abortion in the event of exposure, which conflicts with the professional
norm of “non-directive” counseling in connection with prenatal testing for genetic
defects, might fail strict scrutiny (for example, if conscientious objectors declined to
supply teratogens accompanied by such patient labeling).
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